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Donald M. Hassler 
The Scottish Reasoning of James Hutton: 
Poet in Spite of Himself 
"We have, first, Burnet's Theory of the Earth. This surely 
cannot be considered in any other light than as a dream, formed 
upon the poetic fiction of a golden age ... Theory of the Earth" 
(1975). 
The rest of this passage from the first volume of James 
Hutton's seminal contribution to Enlightenment geology will have 
to wait until the conclusion of my paper when it will be clearer 
that Hutton's text, like so many literary texts that we have now 
come to anatomize, may conceal as much as it reveals. In fact, 
ever since Stanley Edgar Hyman's essays on Darwin, Marx, 
Frazer and Freud as imaginative writers in The Tangled Bank 
some of us have been led to read scientists as poets. Hyman 
evokes Yeats's statement that the voices in his vision came to 
give him "metaphors for poetry."l I suggest that for speculative 
scientists, especially during the formative years for modern 
science in the 18th-century Enlightenment, the voices of 
observational experience provided images that were so powerful, 
so sublime, that in spite of themselves those scientists toyed with 
speculative theories and implications that went far beyond what 
they would acknowledge, even to themselves, as plausible. In 
other words, images led them beyond belief-beyond what they 
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were willing to state as true. In this way, those scientists were 
indeed much like poets as, perhaps, all scientists are. The 
example I know best is Erasmus Darwin, who actually wrote 
poems along with his speculative science. 2 Hutton also, who 
never published any belles lettres, may be read as a writer whose 
images, as well as imaginative methodology, may have led him 
beyond the limits of his own belief-and certainly beyond the 
limits that subsequent scholarship has placed on his thought. In 
the pages of his most important work, Hutton was not the 
complacent Deist who is represented in most accounts of him. 
Paradoxically, Hutton's first readers and his associates who 
knew him best were probably his most perceptive readers. He 
had some exchange of correspondence with Erasmus Darwin and 
many associations with the slightly wildly imaginative Lunar 
Society of Birmingham.3 Further, the academic who popularized 
Hutton's rather ponderous treatise, John Playfair, clearly played 
down the Deistic argument from design in his 1802 Illustrations 
of the Hullolliall Theory of the Earth. Thus it seems somewhat 
inappropriate that the subsequent consensus has been so strong 
about Hutton's belief in design in nature though such piety is, 
clearly, the overall surface belief that he states and restates 
thoughout his text. Though Charles Coulston Gillispie's 
important work on Genesis and Geology recognizes Hutton's 
conservative intentions, Stephen Toulmin and June Goodfield in 
their book on time seem to read this Huttonian Deism most 
emphatically: 
James Hutton's handling of the geological evidence might 
seem revolutionary, but his fundamental aims were 
conservative and devout. . .. [He] might with equal 
consistency have extrapolated his argument, dispensed 
with the hypothetical Creation entirely, and used his 
discoveries to argue that past time was not merely 
indefinite but infinite.4 
Hutton's daring extrapolation, exactly what is denied by 
Toulmin and Goodfield, is the topic of this paper. But in order 
to understand his extrapolation I need, first, to borrow a 
wonderfully suggestive phrase about Hutton from a quaint little 
book that is the most complete account of his work in our time 
that I have found. Edward Battersby Bailey was himself an 
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eminent geologist at the University of Glasgow, so his book on 
Hutton is understandably more concerned with the geology than 
with the literary implications in the writing. 5 We learn from 
Bailey that Hutton also did state of the art thinking for his time, 
pu blishing on phlogiston chemistry, physics, agriculture; we also 
glean from Bailey enough biographical detail about the life of 
this Edinburgh intellectual, his travels, his farming enterprise, to 
wish for a more complete biography. Hutton shared the same 
strange, pre-revolutionary milieu that mingled the Calvinist 
discipline, which drove David Hume to a spiritual exile still 
troubled by its memory, with the open-minded Enlightenment 
speculation that Hume cultivated in France. Though I have not 
discovered a direct connection, the presence of Scottish Hume in 
this discussion of Hutton is important; and it is the picture of the 
freely extrapolating mind divided against itself that, I suggest, 
links the two countrymen.6 A phrase from Bailey's book on 
Hutton's thought, however, is the catalyst. The phrase actually 
appears in the Foreword to the book and is written by another 
Scottish academic scientist, J.E. Richey: 
Bailey has supplied thoughout, a commentary on Hutton's 
deductions which perhaps only Bailey with his personal 
knowledge of Scotland and parts of Europe to which 
Hutton has referred could have made with such 
confidence and consideration. He, too, has brought 
insight into the difficulties of many fundamental 
geological problems recognized by Hutton [problems with 
belief?], and appreciation of the intelligence and Scottish 
power of arguement which Hutton applied in his 
deductions.1 
Rather than mapping as Bailey does the geologic features, I will 
outline briefly in what follows Hutton's notion of an open-ended 
methodology-a kind of Humean calculus of analysis-and his 
notion of infinite, rather than indefinite, time. This will be, 
then, a less than Deist map of images, perhaps a Scottish map, 
certainly an Enlightenment map. 
The distinctions I want to draw are delicate and, themselves, 
speculative because there is no question that the traditional recent 
readings of Hutton can be supported with many passages in 
which he clearly speaks of his belief in design, in "the presence 
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and efficacy of design and intelligence in the power that 
conducts the work."s Thus for me to look for "absence" in this 
work (J mean, of course, Hutton's work as well as nature) may 
seem truly deconstructive in the worst sense. But J find Hutton's 
writing most powerful and evocative at exactly those points 
where the notion of design fades to the background and where 
those two other notions, admittedly so popular in our time (we 
read what we want to read), of an open-ended methodology and 
sublime infinities of time surface. Like many of the late 18th-
century philosophes, I think, Hutton was toying with speculative 
notions that were fundamentally inconsistent with his stated 
beliefs. Further, such doubleness of mind enlivens his work and 
drives what is, also, a long and digressive work toward a kind of 
poetry of speculation that not only may be the reason for his 
influence but also may recommend his thought to us as a more 
complex Deist than we had thought. 
First on the topic of methodology, then, Hutton prefers to 
describe a sort of triangulating around all possibilities, a 
narrowing of one's "limits" towards the best answer. He does 
acknowledge that facts cannot be dealt with outside of some 
general theory or initial framework: 
Appearances cannot well be descirbed except in relation 
to some theory or general arrangement of the subject; 
because the particular detail, of every part 10 a 
complicated appearance, would be endless and 
insignificant.9 
Not only does the end of this statement hint at the 
methodological nightmare of endlessly proliferating detail but 
also it implies that the formative and overall "general 
arrangement" must be anthropomorphic or, at least, some fleshed 
out godly design. But when Hutton, on occasion in the work, 
speaks more specifically about method, the formative general 
theory always seems to be more abstract and literally 
disembodied. Here he is speaking earlier in the first volume 
about a process of systematic dOUbting, or the elimination of 
possibilities: 
so far as we know our error, or the deficiency in 
our operation, we proceed in science, and shall conclude 
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in reason. It is not given to man to know what things are 
truly in themselves, but only what those things are in his 
thought. We seek not to know the precise measure of any 
thing; we only understand the limits of a thing, in 
knowing what it is not, either on the one side or the 
other. IO 
I suggest that this approach of systematic doubt and narrowing of 
one's limits is the most open methodology one can adopt. 
Eventually, all things can be compared and eliminated by such a 
process so that the methodology actually circles back on itself, 
and one is left not with a general theory but with the endless 
pro liferating of possibilities. On methodology, then, Hutton 
seems to be good at the double talk of insisting on starting with a 
general or core set of assumptions and yet, at the same time, 
making those assumptions so open and flexible in themselves that 
any conclusion can be reached at the end of an investigation. In 
our time, we never question such openness; but systematic 
doubting of this sort is a major step for a Deist. 
Further, I find it is the reasoning about "limits"-or the 
language of limits at least-that Hutton turns to most when he 
wants to describe the longer geologic time frames that his 
observations about igneous rock formation as well as about 
sedimentary rock formation have led him to hypothesize. Also, 
he is apt to use the word "infinite" in this context as often as the 
word "indefinite." I suppose the argument is that as long as he 
specifies "indefinite" time frames he is leaving room for divine 
action at the beginning or the end whereas "infinite" time leaves 
less room, paradoxically, for Deistic intervention. But I think 
the more important thing to notice is the way Hutton applies his 
methodology of limits to his thought on time so that, I think, the 
result is an opening out toward possibility and sublimity of 
image. In other words, Hutton's imagination seems to be carried 
away not so much by the observational facts he has gathered, 
although the empirical evidence comes to him in an undeniable 
way like the voices to Yeats, as by speculation itself. Early in 
the work he speaks about infinite time frames, then later he 
speaks of triangulating the limits at either end of an epoch-what 
Charles Lyell, his important uniformitarian disciple (and another 
Scotsman), would suggest initial numbers for in his Principles of 
Geology (1830-33).11 I suggest that the energy of the writing 
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and the scope of the images indicate how Hutton's Deistic frame 
is giving way to a more open and sublime notion: 
Time, which measures every thing in our idea [I assume 
his overall theorizing], and is often deficient to our 
schemes, is to nature endless and as nothing; it cannot 
limit that by which alone it had existence; and, as the 
natural course of time, which to us seems infinite, cannot 
be bounded by any operation that may have an end, the 
progress of things upon this globe, that is, the course of 
nature, cannot be limited by time, which must proceed in 
a continual succession. We are, therfore, to consider as 
inevitable the destruction of our land.12 
He is needing to argue, of course, that enough time is available 
for his notion of slow, uniform change to produce what we know 
are major structural changes in the surface of the Earth. But 
later, when he is discussing the notion of definite "epochs," he 
has to use the measure of "limits" again. His very use of limits, 
his flexible and skeptical tool, however, reminds him of infinity 
once more: 
This [an early point in geologic history], however, is not 
the beginning of those operations which proceed in time 
... nor is it the extablishing of that, which, in the course 
of time, had no beginning; it is only the limit of our 
retrospective view of those operations which have come 
to pass in time. 13 
To conclude my reading of Hutton's imagery, 1 want to look 
at the rest of the passage about "poetic fiction" that 1 placed at 
the head of this essay. As an investigator with a lot more 
evidence, Hutton knows that Thomas Burnet's attempt to link 
na tural history and sacred history is wrong; but Hutton goes on 
following the passage 1 quoted at the first to acknowledge that "at 
the same time, there are certain appearances in the earth which 
would, in a partial view of things, seem to justify that 
imagination."B In other words, appearances and empirical 
evidence do not preclude imagination. AllY dogmatic view, in 
fact, seems less to fit with the ever-changing "limits" of 
observation. 1 would suggest, finally, that Hutton's own 
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imagination, set to work by "appearances of things" but also by 
speculation-and in spite of himself-envisioned the very thing 
his own contemporaries feared and worte vehemently about in 
criticism of his work. As one of his major critics, Richard 
Kirwan, wrote, "[Hutton envisioned] an abyss, from which 
human reason recoils.,,15 Further, this daring vision, though not 
uniquely Scottish, may remind us of the vision of Hutton's fellow 
Scot, David Hume, whose imaginative thinking arrived at the 
equally abysmal conclusion, paraphrased from Aristophanes, that 
"Whirl is king, having deposed Zeus."lo 
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